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“I Ask the Profession to Stand Still”: 
The Evolution of American Public 
Accountancy, 1927-1962
Abstract: This paper traces the emergence of the AICPA as an effective 
national representative of the American profession. Central to this 
evolution was a broadening of the Institute’s outlook to encompass all 
practicing CPAs and to embrace the benefits of public relations and 
lobbying. The paper begins with the Wall Street elite that dominated 
the Institute’s predecessor, the AIA, and describes the pressures for re-
form that culminated in the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 and set 
this evolution in motion. The final section makes use of former AICPA 
president Marquis Eaton’s papers to show how pressure from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, from competing professions, 
and from a geometric increase in the profession’s numbers brought 
a more pragmatic and aggresive leadership to the Institute, one that 
more closely resembles the modern AICPA. 
INTRODUCTION
Studies of the U.S. accounting profession’s development 
often end with the 1930s, viewing the New Deal, the unification 
of the profession in 1936, and the McKesson & Robbins (M&R) 
scandal of 1939 as the seminal events in the profession’s history 
[Miranti, 1990; Sriram and Vollmers, 1997]. Few emphasize the 
importance of the next two decades and the realignment of the 
profession’s leadership and goals took place. This paper focuses 
on the crucial years of 1927-1962, when accountants evolved 
from an insular, divided group with an uncertain mandate from 
American society for its services to a profession eager to pro-
mote itself and to expand its reach and responsibilities. From 
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the beginning of the push to reform U.S. capital markets with 
William Z. Ripley’s 1927 polemic Main Street and Wall Street 
to the M&R audit scandal, the leadership of the profession 
remained aloof from the opinions of those outside the profes-
sion. But in the wake of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 
and M&R, a new generation of leaders began to take a more 
expansive view of the profession’s proper role. Faced with pres-
sure from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), from 
competing professions, and from a geometric increase in the 
profession’s numbers, a more pragmatic group took the reins 
of accounting’s national leadership, embodied in the AIA, and 
began to embrace the benefits of public relations and lobbying. 
They were motivated not only by their own vision of a greater 
public profile as an essential part of a true profession but by 
the inroads competing professions were making into CPAs’ 
hard-won jurisdictions in financial-statement audits, taxes, and 
the burgeoning field of management-advisory services. This led 
them to a more aggressive and self-interested stance for the 
profession, eagerly seeking out new venues and new revenue for 
CPAs’ skills. Beginning with the union corruption scandals of 
the 1950s and the promotion of the CPA’s abilities as “business 
advisors” in 1962 testimony before Congress by incoming AICPA 
president Robert Witschey, the AICPA’s increasingly aggressive 
lobbying efforts on behalf of its members showed how far the 
profession’s evolution had taken it.
This paper retraces the profession’s path through the seis-
mic shocks of the Great Depression, the New Deal, and M&R 
and evaluates the role these events played in shifting the profes-
sion’s leadership away from the aristocratic traditions of the 
Wall Street-centered elite and towards a more pragmatic gen-
eration more in sync with the unique public-private regulatory 
model the New Dealers envisioned for the profession. Particular 
attention is paid to the efforts of John Carey, a non-accountant 
who, as executive director of the AIA and the AICPA, became the 
profession’s cheerleader everywhere from his editorial column 
in the Journal of Accountancy to the halls of Congress and state 
legislatures; to Marquis Eaton, who laid the groundwork for 
the profession’s new public-relations efforts and presided over 
the name change that finally, after 20 years of resistance from 
the profession’s old guard, made the AICPA the official repre-
sentative of CPAs; and to Carman Blough who, as the first chief 
accountant of the SEC and later as director of research for the 
AICPA, probably did more to improve the quality of financial 
reporting in the U.S. than any other individual in accounting’s 
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history.
The best known and most colorful of the older generation, 
George O. May of Price Waterhouse & Co., also figures promi-
nently in this paper. May’s career is in many ways the best 
vehicle from which to describe the evolution of the American 
profession. He personified the old-world model of the gentle-
man professional, confident that his professional expertise made 
his integrity clear to outsiders and largely obviated the need for 
formal regulation. This model proved incompatible with Pro-
gressive notions of legal standards of conduct for market actors, 
and May’s influence steadily waned after the 1930s. Accounting’s 
next generation of leaders better understood the demands that a 
nation with an historic aversion to government oversight placed 
on professions. This generation (slowly) implemented more uni-
form accounting and auditing principles and procedures and ac-
cepted responsibility for the quality of work of all CPAs. But in 
navigating the course laid out for them, the AICPA found itself 
defending more and more professional territory, expanding into 
new fields, and fighting off challenges from competing profes-
sions that threatened its members’ practices. Soon this dialectic 
had made the CPA a businessman more than a disinterested pro-
fessional, and May was one of the few voices lamenting that the 
ideal his generation had strived for had been left behind. The 
portrayal of May is meant to help illustrate the tension at the 
heart of this story, that while much of the paper would certainly 
qualify as a Whig interpretation of history, this evolution is what 
ultimately led to the profession becoming more self-interested. 
The professionalization of accounting, in short, is what caused 
the damage to the profession’s credibility. 
This paper is in the style of traditional narrative history, 
employing archival sources to offer a portrait of the U.S. pro-
fession in the mid-20th century. The first half of the paper 
describes the profession under the leadership of the national 
accounting firms, referred to throughout as the Wall Street elite 
because of its clientele’s listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). The papers of James M. Landis and George O. May, 
combined with practitioner journals, mainstream media sourc-
es, and an abundant secondary literature on the New Deal (per-
haps the only era of the U.S. profession to have received thor-
ough, critical evaluation by multiple historians) are the bases for 
these sections. The heart of the paper are the years beginning in 
1939, years that previous historians have largely framed around 
the development of accounting principles [see Zeff, 1971, 2003; 
Chatov, 1975; Previts and Merino, 1998]. But this was only one 
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aspect, and as will be argued, not the most important in the 
profession’s evolution over the two decades following the M&R 
scandal. The papers of former AICPA president Eaton have been 
available at the University of Florida since the 1970s, but as far 
as the author can determine have never been used. These mem-
os and letters provide a wealth of information on how and why 
the AICPA became just another “trade organization” that aided 
accounting firms in “serving their own business interests” at the 
expense of the investing public [Turner, 2006, p. 392].
The story in this paper fits neatly into the existing para-
digms of the professionalization literature. Accounting histo-
rians have made use of Abbott’s jurisdiction model (see below) 
and Macdonald and Ritzer’s dilemma of exclusiveness vs. 
market control1 to describe the growth of public accountancy in 
several nations [e.g., Carnegie et al. 2003; Walker, 2004; Edwards 
et al. 2005]. The U.S. offers its own iteration. In the 1920s, the 
profession was divided into two national factions along lines 
of practice (national firms auditing big business with local 
practices providing basic accounting services) and background 
(northeasterners strongly influenced by British practice vs. 
southerners and midwesterners often of non-Anglo-Saxon de-
scent). This schism left the profession without an authoritative 
voice and the two groups merged in 1936 expressly to lay claim 
to representing the entire profession. In the postwar era, an 
expanding economy created opportunities for other professions 
to challenge CPAs’ jurisdictions in audit, tax, and management 
consulting. But by this time, a united profession, led by an ag-
gressive leadership, could successfully defend the CPAs’ territory. 
THE AIA ELITE AND THE SECURITIES ACTS
Writing of the American legal profession in the early 20th 
century, Galambos [1983, p. 488] describes “a profession virtu-
ally controlled by a WASP elite, which used its power and status 
to ward off threats from liberal reformers and the country’s 
new immigrants.” A similar picture emerges in the accounting 
profession of the 1920s. Accounting’s dominant voices were 
national firms such as Price, Waterhouse & Co., headquartered 
in New York and conducting financial-statement audits for the 
largest American corporations. Until the M&R scandal, this Wall 
1 Macdonald and Ritzer [1988, pp. 257-258] write “…to control the market, 
the occupational body must include anyone with a reasonable claim to expertise, 
but such inclusion brings in marginal practitioners who lower the standing of 
higher-status practitioners.”
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Street elite served as the profession’s national voice. 
These men formed the leadership of the AIA, which like the 
AICPA was a voluntary organization (In the U.S., licensing of 
CPAs is reserved to the individual states.). Until 1921, the AIA 
served as the only national organization of public accountants. 
Many of its leaders were British chartered accountants sent to 
the U.S. to develop an American presence for their firms. In 
1926, one-fifth of the AIA’s membership consisted of accountants 
born outside the U.S. [see Nissley, 1928, p. 37]. They tended to 
favor an apprenticeship system similar to their own training, 
rather than the more egalitarian college education prevalent in 
the U.S. In many cases, they were also reluctant to associate 
with men of southern and eastern European heritages [Miranti, 
1990, p. 123]. Most importantly, they did not respect the CPA 
certificate, which they dismissed as a state-regulated license 
that conferred legitimacy on an inferior class of accountants. 
In 1919, the AIA had attempted to secure legislation in Con-
gress that would recognize its membership as superior to a 
CPA license. As late as 1926, the AIA refused to limit its future 
membership to CPAs [Springer, 1936a, p. 749]. This finally led 
to the creation of a rival national organization, the American 
Society of Certified Public Accountants (ASCPA), in 1921. This 
is the most conspicuous example of the AIA’s failure to exercise 
leadership for the profession. At a time when it could have taken 
all CPAs under its wing and embraced responsibility for raising 
the professional standards of all public accountants in the U.S., 
the AIA instead chose to distance itself from the rest of the pro-
fession. 
Many small town CPAs in the 1920s may also have found 
it difficult to relate to the AIA’s official periodical, the Journal 
of Accountancy, particularly to the style of its editor, A.P. Rich-
ardson. Durand Springer, founder of the ASCPA, reportedly 
“could not stomach the leisurely ways of the elite who in those 
days dominated the Institute’s activities…Heading that elite 
group was A.P. Richardson, a nonaccountant and an import who 
has often been referred to as the epitome of a perfect English 
gentleman”2 [Kohler, 1975, p. 27]. After stepping down as editor 
in 1936 (to be replaced by John Carey), Richardson [1040. p. 
217] returned to the Journal in 1939 with a regular column titled 
“This Blessed Language” of which the following passage is rep-
2 “Perfect English gentleman” was apparently a style Richardson affected. 
Alphyon Perry Richardson was born and raised in New Jersey, never attended 
college, and worked as a reporter for the Wall Street Journal [O’Neill, 1980, p. 1].
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resentative: 
Take...the quotation: ‘Only the brave deserves the 
fair’;…as the sentence stands it means of course that 
the brave man and no one else deserves the fair. If we 
say ‘The only brave deserves the fair,’ we may mean that 
an Indian warrior is deserving or that there is no more 
than one brave man.‘The brave only deserves the fair’ 
probably means that our hero deserves the fair but is 
not to have her. Now, moving our wandering adverb an-
other step forward, we say ‘The brave deserves only the 
fair’ and we imply that the brave man deserves nothing 
except the fair. Again ‘The brave deserves the only fair.’ 
Here we find that the choice is limited. If there be other 
ladies present they do not qualify. And, finally, if we say 
‘The brave deserves the fair only,’ I don’t know exactly 
what it means.
The AIA’s inadequacy as a leadership organization became 
particularly apparent in the crisis years that followed the stock 
market crash of 1929. Pressure had been building on the profes-
sion since the publication of economics professor William Z. 
Ripley’s Main Street and Wall Street in 1927, which brought the 
issue of financial reporting to the attention of a broader public. 
His portrayal of auditors as too-closely tied to their corporate 
clients and lacking authoritative standards for financial report-
ing brought unwanted attention to the profession [Richardson, 
1927a, p. 254; Kohler, 1933b, p. 142]. But the AIA leadership 
was reluctant to take action. It was George O. May, senior part-
ner at Price, Waterhouse & Co., who saw the handwriting on 
the wall for reform and led the first effort to improve the quality 
of financial reporting. As early as 1926, May [1936, pp. 44, 46] 
warned: “There is not in the profession as it now exists a body 
of men capable of dealing adequately with the problem…at the 
present time auditors hold office usually at the pleasure of the 
officers of the company.” Ripley’s writings spurred May to take 
the initiative in reforming financial accounting practices [May 
Papers, 57-6; AICPA, 1960]. May would write: “It is becoming 
recognized that if the interests of all affected by corporate de-
velopment – and that includes a large proportion of our people – 
are to be protected, it is vitally important that some basic princi-
ples of accounting should be established and given substantially 
the force of law” [May Papers 53-6, September 11, 1930]. May’s 
efforts led to the NYSE requiring annual financial statement au-
dits for all listed firms in 1932 and to the publication of Audits of 
Corporate Accounts (1934), at the time the most comprehensive 
effort to establish accounting principles.
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By this time, in no small part due to the revelations of the 
Pecora hearings in Congress, May had lost the initiative and fed-
eral legislation became inevitable [Seligman, 1982, p. 2; Flesher 
and Flesher, 1986, p. 421]. Inexplicably, though, the profession 
was caught by surprise by the 1933 Securities Act, passed during 
President Roosevelt’s “Hundred Days” with the goal of restoring 
confidence in U.S.capital markets. “Despite William Z. Ripley, 
despite Berle and Means, despite the Pecora investigation, de-
spite public demand for reform of the securities markets, the 
Institute had made no effective preparation to deal with legisla-
tion directed to that end” [Carey, 1969, p. 182]. The obloquy 
even came from the accounting academe. Eric Kohler [1933a, p. 
164], editor of The Accounting Review, railed against “the inher-
ent snobbishness in many of the Institute’s published reports – a 
snobbishness and lack of good taste that have their origin in a 
real ignorance of the things at stake in the accounting profes-
sion. There is no indication of any understanding of the prob-
lems that lie ahead; no appreciation of the newer opportunities 
for the profession in the bloodless social revolution in which we 
have been immersed during the past year.” After the passage of 
the 1933 act, the profession quickly realized its importance, and 
both the AIA and ASCPA sent representatives to Washington to 
help write the detailed regulations to implement the law [Landis 
papers, Folder 2-3; Chatov, 1975, p. 56; Zeff, 2008, p. 177]. 
 Without a unified voice, accountants had been unable to ex-
ercise any real influence on the 1933 act. Colonel Arthur Carter 
of the New York State Society (NYSSCPA), apparently on his 
own initiative, did testify at the congressional hearings leading 
up the 1933 act, though it is interesting to note that he report-
edly did so as a gesture of U.S. accountants’ independence from 
the British-dominated AIA [Carey, 1979, p. 34]. The impact of 
Carter’s testimony is unclear; contemporary newspaper coverage 
suggests it was quickly forgotten [New York Times (NYT), April 
2, 1933, p. 1; Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1933, p. 8; see also Wi-
esen, 1978]. One reason may have been Carter’s imperious tone: 
Sen. Barkley: You audit the controllers?
Col. Carter: Yes, the public accountant audits the con-
troller’s account.
Sen. Barkley: Who audits you?
Col. Carter: Our conscience.
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The pompous spirit of much of the AIA alienated not only 
the vast majority of U.S. CPAs (most of whom did not belong 
to either the AIA or the ASCPA) but also the New Dealers who 
wrote the Securities Acts. James Landis, the chief author of the 
Securities Acts and later chairman of the SEC, summed up the 
profession this way in 1936: “The impact of almost daily tilts 
with accountants, some of them called leaders in their profes-
sion, often leaves little doubt that their loyalties to management 
are stronger than their sense of responsibility to the investor” 
[Carey, 1979, p. 36]. Landis particularly had in mind May, who 
had worked closely with Landis in the months after the 1933 
act and who had garnered a reputation as the profession’s “phi-
losopher” [Carey, 1970, p. 3]. Born in England in 1873, May was 
extremely well educated despite never having attended college, 
instead rising up through an apprecticeship to join Price, Wa-
terhouse & Co. in London [Grady, 1962, pp. 9-13; Parker, 2010, 
p. 5]. In 1896, he was sent by the British firm to conduct audits 
in the U.S. and was one of the founders of the U.S. profession. 
Landis [1959, p. 35, fn. 12] felt such antipathy towards May 
that a quarter century after the Securities Acts, he found space 
in a 20-page law journal article to single him out for criticism: 
“Despite the fact now generally recognized that the registration 
requirements of the Securities Act have introduced into the ac-
counting profession ethical and professional standards compa-
rable to those of other recognized professions, the then dean of 
the accounting profession, George O. May of Price, Waterhouse 
& Co. was strangely opposed to our proposed requirements for 
independent accountants.” And Landis was not the only one. 
William Paton [1981, pp. 91-94], professor of accounting at 
the University of Michigan and one of the leading accounting 
theorists of his generation, remembers May as “a very conceited 
Englishman, and hypersensitive to criticism, even when some-
what justified…his brusque way of disposing of questions he 
didn’t like, and his rather domineering attitude toward all those 
daring to ask questions, annoyed both faculty and students…I 
understand that I was one of only three people who dared to 
call him ‘George.’” More significantly, Landis’ opinion of May 
seems to have extended to the entire profession. He wrote to 
Felix Frankfurter: “I was up the night before and talked to some 
accountants…a very strange class of people whom I suppose by 
the very nature of their profession are without any humor” [Par-
rish, 1970, p. 200]. The feeling was apparently mutual. Carey 
[1979, p. 35] would remember: “Mr. Landis was not so easy to 
deal with. Cordial and conciliatory at first, he became increas-
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ingly critical of the accounting profession. He was a thin, tense, 
somewhat impatient man, almost humorless, and clearly feeling 
the pressure of his new responsibilities.” 
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act, passed by Congress 
and signed by Roosevelt on June 6, 1934, created the SEC and 
granted it power to regulate Wall Street, including the account-
ants who audited publicly traded companies. It might have 
been expected that without the trappings of a true profession 
(one organization representing all practicing accountants, clear 
independence from their corporate clients, an established lob-
bying presence in Washington), the SEC would not have trusted 
the profession to handle such an essential cog in U.S. capital 
markets as big business’ financial communications to the public. 
But such was not the case. Despite the SEC’s lack of confidence 
in accountants, the profession was largely left to govern itself, 
putting in place a regulatory regime that has since been the ob-
ject of almost constant criticism from Congress, the media, and 
historians [U.S. Congress, 1976; Previts and Merino 1998, pp. 
271, 318; Zeff, 2003, pp. 195-196]. As an historian of the Securi-
ties Acts concluded: “Nothing jarred the SEC’s confidence in the 
accounting profession’s ability to evolve more uniform terminol-
ogy and techniques. Commissioners and staff members merely 
became impatient” [Parrish, 1970, p. 206]. By 1939, Landis had 
concluded: “As long as you have the May leadership in the ac-
counting situation, I have very little hope of seeing them accom-
plish much” [quoted in Parrish, 1970, p. 206]. 
 
THE SECURITIES ACTS’ IMPACT ON THE PROFESSION
The passage of the Securities Acts was the single most 
important event in the professionalization of accounting; they 
legitimized the profession by granting it an exclusive franchise 
to conduct financial-statement audits, providing auditors with 
the leverage to resist the demands of their corporate clients.
They imposed clear accountability with liability standards for 
negligence. As dicussed below, they spurred the unification of 
the profession in 1936. And there was near universal agreement 
among contemporaries that they improved the quality of finan-
cial reporting by encouraging the development of more uniform 
accounting principles [Certified Public Accountant, 1933, p. 597; 
Smith, 1937, p. 152; Cooper and Ijiri, 1979, p. 36]. Finally, the 
acts enshrined a regulatory framework that, regardless of its ef-
fectiveness, has presided over the most successful capital market 
in the history of the world.
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The experience of the Securities Acts did spur the consolida-
tion of the AIA and ASCPA in 1936. Hostility between the two 
groups, based not only on differences in clientele and scale but 
on class and ethnicity, had at times reached puerile levels. From 
1927 to 1932, the respective journals of the two organizations, 
the Journal of Accountancy and The Certified Public Accountant, 
rarely even mentioned the name of its rival. Robert Montgomery 
[1939a, p. 38], of the national firm Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Mont-
gomery, noted: “The profession had been greatly handicapped 
in its contacts with governmental agencies in Washington, due 
to the inability of the representatives of the two societies to 
represent the interests of the profession as a whole.” But even 
with this in mind, acrimony nearly destroyed the union. As 
Montgomery [1939b, p. 72] remembered it: “The retiring [AIA] 
president was bitterly opposed to the merger. For some obscure 
and wholly unfounded reason, he argued that the AIA would 
be diluted in quality and reduced in prestige by the proposed 
merger.” Members of the ASCPA pointedly noted that it was 
not a “merger” at all. Even at this late date, the AIA refused the 
ASCPA’s proposal that the two organizations combine into a new 
organization to be called “The American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants.” Instead, the ASCPA was “absorbed” into 
the AIA despite the fact that less than 3% of the AIA’s members 
by 1936 were non-CPAs [Springer, 1936b]. It would take two 
more decades of fighting before the AIA explicitly became the 
national organization of CPAs, and then only in response to the 
encroachments of unlicensed public accountants. 
Carman Blough’s role in the profession’s leadership began 
in these years. Having worked his way up through the ranks 
of state government in Wisconsin, Blough probably had more 
in common with the ASCPA than the AIA elite [Miranti, 1990, 
p. 153]. While working at the Wisconsin State Board of Public 
Affairs, he met George Mathews, a future SEC commissioner, 
and, in 1934, he joined the SEC as a financial analyst. By 1935, 
the SEC decided a need existed for a “final arbitrator in all ac-
counting problems facing the Commission,” and Blough was 
appointed the first chief accountant of the SEC [Cooper, 1982, 
pp. xviii, 8]. Carey remembered that “there could not have been 
a more fortunate appointment…tempermentally he was ideally 
suited for the new job…He was open minded, willing to listen” 
[Cooper, 1982, p. xiv].
But while a more affable presence than James Landis, 
Blough was a stern advocate for more formalized accounting 
principles. He told the NYSSCPA in 1937: 
10
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Almost daily, principles that for years I had thought 
were definitely accepted among the members of the 
profession are violated in a registration statement 
prepared by some accountant in whom I have high 
confidence. Indeed, an examination of hundreds of 
statements filed with our Commission almost leads one 
to the conclusion that aside from the simple rules of 
double entry bookkeeping, there are very few principles 
of accounting upon which the accountants of this coun-
try are in agreement [Carey, 1970, p. 10]. 
Carey [1970. p. 11] remembered: “The cumulative effect of 
this speech was devastating.” Blough would later add: “Unless 
the profession took steps to reduce the areas of difference in 
accounting practices the Commission would” [quoted in Zeff, 
1972, p. 132]. It was Blough’s hope that the profession would ac-
cept the challenge: “I have emphasized at numerous times that 
the policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission was to 
encourage the accountants to develop uniformity of procedure 
themselves, in which case we would follow” [AIA, 1937, p.190]. 
He certainly had his work cut out for him in persuading the 
Wall Street elite to embrace formalized rules at the expense of 
professional discretion. As a Lybrand, Ross Bros. partner pro-
tested, “There is the idea that standardized accounting is a sim-
ple matter, that the only reason it has not advanced further is to 
be found in the ignorance or dishonesty of accountants and the 
management of large industries” [Warren, 1934, p. 10]. The SEC 
received some support for its efforts from accounting academics 
when their organization, the American Accounting Association, 
issued “A Tentative Statement of Accounting Principles Affect-
ing Corporate Reports” in 1936 [Carey, 1970, pp. 11-12]. Blough 
and others at the SEC sedulously pursued improved accounting 
principles until the M&R scandal undermined the old guard’s 
claim to leadership of the profession.
HOW M&R AND WORLD WAR II CHANGED THE 
PROFESSION
 The reforms of the New Deal, although initially intended 
to bring fundamental change to accounting, had little impact 
on the profession over the course of the 1930s. The Wall Street 
elite remained firmly entrenched in the profession’s leadership, 
much to the consternation of accounting’s new overseers at the 
SEC. And however superannuated this elite may have become, 
it clung defiantly to the professional model that had seen it 
through the decade’s crises. In his valedictory address to the AIA 
11
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in 1937, outgoing President Montgomery encouraged his audi-
ence to continue whistling past the graveyard: “We have been 
told so often that we cannot remain still, we must go forward or 
backward, that we are inclined to believe it. Nevertheless, I ask 
the profession to stand still. I do not want it to change” [AIA, 
1937, pp. 89-90].
The forces driving public accountancy to become the pro-
fession the New Dealers envisioned would work slowly over the 
next two decades. The unification of the profession into one 
national organization in 1936 was the first step towards broad-
ening the leadership’s outlook to embrace CPAs throughout the 
U.S. But it was the M&R scandal and the demands that World 
War II placed on accounting that undermined the old-guard 
leadership of the AIA and paved the way for U.S. public account- 
ancy’s next generation of leaders.
The M&R scandal was uncovered in December 1938. From 
1923 to 1937, auditors from Price, Waterhouse & Co. had been 
accepting fraudulent inventory and accounts receivable records 
prepared by a convicted felon operating under an assumed 
name [NYT, December 24, 1938, p. 4, January 13, 1939, p. 38]. 
The revelation that systematic fraud had been perpetrated un-
der the nose of the profession’s premier firm made headlines 
in newspapers all over the country and led to major changes in 
audit procedures. It also proved a major blow to the elite gen-
eration’s control of the profession, both to its prestige and to its 
numbers, as the practice of relying on temporary workers came 
under greater scrutiny and the ranks of full-time CPAs swelled. 
It occurred just as the AIA was beginning to take steps towards 
the establishment of accounting principles, short-circuiting the 
elite’s efforts to placate the SEC [Previts and Robinson, 1996, 
p. 69]. In September 1938, the AIA’s Committee on Accounting 
Procedure (CAP) had recommended that it be given additional 
responsibilities and personnel, “recognizing the existence of 
a widespread demand for greater uniformity” [Carey, 1970, p. 
12]. The CAP’s work continued after the scandal as it issued 51 
Accounting Research Bulletins by 1959, to be succeeded by the 
Accounting Principles Board. 
The lurid events of the fraud brought the profession unprec-
edented public scrutiny. Within a month of the revelation of the 
scandal, the attorney general of New York summoned leaders of 
the AIA to his office to discuss what reforms were needed, and 
his office issued a statement that “the Coster-Musica [M&R] 
case [has] revealed certain fundamental weaknesses in the 
preparation of financial statements of large corporations” (NYT, 
12
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
123Doron, Evolution of American Public Accountancy
December 24, 1938, p. 4]. The new chairman of the SEC, Jerome 
Frank, hoped the fallout from M&R would mark “a turning 
point in accounting standards” and called on accountants to 
take the lessons of the scandal to heart and begin to accept the 
responsibilities the New Dealers had laid out for them six years 
before: “Without in any way indicating what the applicable law 
and morals may have been in the past, I suggest that the McKes-
son & Robbins case…raises, for the future, certain questions 
with respect to corporations whose securities are listed or regis-
tered. While the controller serves not only the management but 
also the stockholders, should not the accountant serve the man-
agement and the stockholders and the bondholders and other 
creditors? And should not the accountant serve not merely the 
existing stockholders and bondholders, but all future investors” 
[NYT, January 9, 1939, p. 45]?
The profession showed a new sensitivity to public relations 
by responding quickly to the crisis. By May 1939, six months 
after the scandal broke, new procedures were put in place that 
required physical checking of inventory and confirmation of re-
ceivables. A new tone could be detected in response to the SEC’s 
investigation into the scandal: 
Such an investigation might not be proper in the case 
of any other profession, but certified public account- 
ants recognize a dual responsibility which is unique – a 
responsibility to the client and a responsibility to the 
public which may rely upon the accountant’s report. 
It was no doubt in the belief that the investing public, 
as represented by the S.E.C., had a right to know all it 
wanted to know about generally accepted auditing pro-
cedure that the accounting profession cooperated fully 
in providing the desired information [Carey, 1941, p. 1].
The new audit procedures, as well as the SEC’s issuance 
of Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 4, requiring for the 
first time “substantial authoritative support” for an account-
ing principle, helped to end the rules vs. judgment debate that 
had marked the profession’s generational fault lines: “The 
significance of McKesson, in combination with ASR 4…was to 
complete the transformation of an accounting professional’s dis-
cretionary roles from individual-laissez-faire driven judgments 
regarding principles and procedures, to a judgmental process 
directed by peer professional standards, guided by a committee 
structure of the AIA” [Previts and Robinson, 1996, p. 76].
Besides making many in the profession more aware of the 
power of public opinion, M&R offered an opening to the smaller 
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firms that desired a greater say in the profession. At a meeting 
with members of New York Governor Lehman’s staff, as the NYT 
[January 9, 1939, p. 11] reported:
A number of [speakers] charged that about 90 per cent 
of all the brokerage and investment firms, as well as the 
greatest industrial firms listed on the Stock and Curb 
Exchanges, were audited by six or seven great firms 
of which Price, Waterhouse, and Co., auditors of the 
McKesson & Robbins Company, was one. With this was 
coupled a charge that the officials of these firms domi-
nated the New York State Society of Certified Public 
Accountants and the American Institute of Accountants 
which resulted in a too lenient interpretation by the 
Association of principles which should be applied to 
all accountancy activity. Speakers declared that where 
small accounting firms, auditing smaller business 
houses, made it an almost invariable practice to check 
on statements of inventories and of accounts receiv-
able before listing them in audit, the larger accounting 
firms, dealing with the books and records of the larger 
houses, in general accepted the statements of officers 
of the companies audited and put them into balance 
sheets without further checks.
The scandal offered those outside the profession’s leader-
ship the opportunity to voice long-simmering resentments of the 
big-firm elite. Clem Collins, who had served as president of the 
AIA from 1937-1939, observed: “Ever since the matter [M&R] 
came up, which is about three years ago, there have been nu-
merous criticisms. When I was president, I received a great 
many letters insinuating that there was not full consideration 
being given, and that because this firm [Price, Waterhouse] was 
a large firm, perhaps they were not subjected to as severe ex-
amination and censure as might be accorded to a smaller firm” 
[Carey, 1970, p. 40].
Coming so quickly on the heels of M&R, U.S. entry into 
World War II saw a perhaps chastened profession respond with 
alacrity to the demands of a wartime economy. As the NYT [No-
vember 10, 1942, p. 41] told its readers: “Recognizing that ac-
counting has become an indispensable element in war produc-
tion and in control of the government’s vast expenditures, the 
executive committee of the American Institute of Accountants 
yesterday announced adoption of a war activities program to 
remain in effect for the duration.” As quickly as January 1942, 
practitioner journals were advising their readers of the new is-
sues their clients would be facing, from contingencies in the 
14
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face of uncertain payment from government funds to questions 
as to whether “accounting reports may be of value to enemy 
forces,” and whether subsidiaries of clients now in enemy hands 
could still be listed as assets on their balance sheets [Towns, 
1942a, p. 270]. 
The war’s effects on U.S. public accountancy would not be 
felt until the post-war era, but their importance should not be 
overlooked. The domestic labor shortages brought large num-
bers of new entrants into the profession. Most prominently, this 
included women, although in the 1950s, many firms returned 
to their pre-war hiring practices, and women lost many of the 
gains they had achieved in accounting [Wootton and Kemmerer, 
2000, p. 175]. In addition, the war greatly expanded the need 
for tax services. Taxes before the war had affected a maximum 
of 6% of the population [Zelizer, 1998, p. 84]. Increased rates of 
personal income taxation as well as wartime excess profits taxes 
added to the complexity and scope of the tax code and gave 
birth to a swelling of the ranks of tax accountants that would 
continue in the post-war era as tax rates remained high [Towns, 
1942a, p. 374; Perry, 1944, p. 139].
The war also saw tremendous advances in the field of 
management-advisory services. The unprecedented scale of 
war contracts led to innovations in business management and 
recordkeeping. “There is no doubt but that WPB and OPA have 
forced many businesses to develop more adequate records” 
[“War Has Changed Old Bookkeeping,” 1944, p. 273]. To imple-
ment machine recordkeeping such as punch-card systems, the 
large accounting firms were often brought in as consultants 
[Higgens, 1965, p. 188]. As Perry [1944. p. 139] summarized it: 
Prior to the war, the average accounting practice was 
largely composed of audit work and preparation of 
tax returns, sweetened on occasion by nonrecurring 
system engagements or cases dealing with new finan- 
cing.The scope of services rendered by accountants has 
been considerably extended in wartime, and it seems 
probable that the success of the profession in handling 
these varied assignments may result in a wider field of 
practice in the future.The problems of business man-
agement have been tremendously complicated by the 
network of wartime controls in the face of expanding 
volume, and shortage of managerial manpower has led 
many clients to turn to professional accountants for as-
sistance.
The dilemma created for the profession by consulting ser-
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vices will be subsequently discussed.
THE POST-WAR PROFESSION
The end of the war found the profession stronger than ever, 
with a younger, more modern generation at the helm. Account-
ing’s impressive contributions to the war effort had enhanced 
the profession’s image: “Many of [our] members occupied high 
places in the armed forces; others served with distinction in an 
advisory capacity. Washington came to know the accounting 
profession better than ever before, and today recognizes the val-
ue of services which professional accountants render to the gov-
ernment” [Carey, 1946, p. 1]. The lessons of M&R provided mo-
mentum to the two campaigns that marked the sharpest break 
from the 1920s generation. The drive for improved accounting 
principles, interrupted by the war, resumed in earnest [Zeff, 
2001], and a new respect for the necessity of public relations 
became central to the profession’s agenda. The combination of 
new leadership that embraced the demands post-war America 
placed on them, an expansion of the profession’s numbers that 
reoriented the national leadership away from the big national 
firms, and the challenges accounting faced from competing 
professions led to a new AIA (soon to become the AICPA) that 
played a pivotal role in molding the profession that exists today.
The AIA’s determination to take all CPAs under its wing, a 
process begun with the consolidation in 1936, meant new priori-
ties to meet the needs of its membership: “The influx of veterans 
and post-World War II CPAs into the profession…[brought] 
a new and much larger generation, more diverse in practice” 
[Previts, 1985, p. 84]. Firms like Price, Waterhouse & Co. had 
traditionally limited their partnership ranks to a select few, but 
the increase in the scale and scope of accounting work in the 
1950s forced it to welcome partners from southern and eastern 
European backgrounds as well as many younger CPAs more 
amenable to the changing times [Allen and McDermott, 1993, 
pp. 93, 115].
Perhaps the most important change resulting from the AIA’s 
expanded membership was a reorientation to the priorities of 
small firms. The AIA’s focus in the post-war era turned away 
from the increasingly independent national firms and towards 
the needs of small practitioners. While the national firms 
expanded to smaller markets and to the international stage, 
smaller firms were growing at an even faster rate: “From 1946 
to 1966 the number of CPA’s associated with the ten largest firms 
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had jumped from 2,950 to 11,850 – a 401% increase. However, 
the total number of CPA’s had jumped from 20,778 to 94,284 
during the same period – a 453% increase” [Carey, 1970, p. 356]. 
Small accounting firms increasingly faced challenges requiring 
an authoritative and representative voice as an ever-expanding 
set of accounting rules, as well as increased automation and 
cost-tracking techniques, placed more demands on CPAs. 
Carman Blough remained on the front lines of this battle, 
becoming director of research for the AIA in 1944. He would 
continue to prod accountants to adopt more uniform proce-
dures for audits and financial-statement preparation as he had 
done in the 1930s as chief accountant of the SEC [Carey, 1970, 
p. 156]. He did this with speeches and a regular column in the 
Journal of Accountancy, “Current Accounting and Auditing 
Problems,” in which he clarified technical accounting issues and 
encouraged the use of best practices, geared particularly to the 
needs of small practitioners. 
Carey had taken over as editor of the Journal of Accountan-
cy in 1937, and he was named executive director of the AIA in 
1948. The contrast with the old Wall Street elite, particularly his 
predecessor as editor of the Journal, A.P. Richardson, could not 
have been more pronounced. Richardson’s flowery, verbose edi-
torials, so incongruous in the pages of a technical practitioner’s 
journal, gave way to a modest, business-like style. Carey [1954, 
p. 33] encouraged a sense of pride and challenged members to 
embrace the “social responsibilities of CPAs” and constantly 
congratulated them on their progress: 
Such rapid growth might have resulted in disorganiza-
tion…on the contrary, professional organization has 
improved…A vast amount of work remains to be done 
before the CPA will be universally accepted as the equal 
of his colleagues in the older professions, [but] for the 
first time, it seems to us, it may be said that the rough 
framework at least [now exists]…to complete the struc-
ture of the accounting profession. 
Carey regularly crisscrossed the U.S., testifying before state 
legislatures and speaking before state and local CPA societies. 
He wrote Professional Ethics of Public Accounting, hailed as a 
“masterpiece,” to placate the SEC’s demands that accountants 
formalize their rules on auditor independence [“Tis Not the 
Whole of Auditing,” 1947, p. 3], and more than anyone else, 
Carey [1949, pp. 3, 5] pressed the need for a greater public pro-
file for the profession: 
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When certified public accountants were a small, com-
paratively obscure group, regarded as technical experts 
who could help management and credit grantors in 
their work, nobody else bothered very much about the 
accounting profession. But now, when auditing, mea-
surement of profit, cost determination, and tax prob-
lems are recognized as matters of vital importance, not 
only to management and credit grantors, but investors, 
labor unions, consumers, economists, analysts, statisti-
cians, lawyers, government policy makers, and others, 
the accounting profession suddenly finds itself in a 
goldfish bowl…we can’t escape the basic truth that pub-
lic opinion will largely determine the accounting pro-
fession’s opportunity for future progress…[in response] 
the Institute has developed a comprehensive public 
relations program. 
For the most part, CPAs supported Carey’s efforts. State 
societies supplemented his work with their own public-relations 
campaigns [“President’s Report – 1947-8,” The Texas Accountant, 
1948, Vol. 21, No. 7, p. 9; “Public Relations Program for 1951-2,” 
The Texas Accountant, 1951, Vol. 24, No. 10, p. 6]. Future AIA 
president Marquis Eaton recognized Carey’s service to the pro-
fession in effusive terms: 
In my opinion it would be impossible for the Institute 
to do too much in acknowledgement of [Carey’s] con-
tribution to the profession…[He] is eligible for retire-
ment in twelve years.That date is not so far off that we 
can postpose any longer our preparation for it…I have 
often heard the question, who are we going to get to 
take John Carey’s place? We should get that question 
out of our thinking. We are not going to get anybody to 
take his place” [Eaton letter , May 5, 1950, group 9, box 
3, F.14; Eaton speech, October 27, 1956, G12, B2, F28, 
University of Florida Papers].
The AIA’s new focus did not win universal acclaim in 
the accounting community. May, now in his third decade of 
retirement, maintained a vigorous and often cantankerous 
correspondence with Institute officials. “I deeply regret the ap-
pointment of an expert in publicity as editor of the Journal of 
Accountancy,” May [May Papers, 58-10, 1956] wrote to Blough. 
“It seems to me to be an acceptance of the view that the function 
of that Journal is to promote the interests of accountants rather 
than to give accountants professional guidance.” To John Inglis 
of Price, Waterhouse & Co., he continued: “I think it is high time 
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somebody protested against Carey’s monopolistic rule in the 
Institute” [May papers, 58-10, 1956]. Nor was May reluctant to 
share his views face-to-face, as the normally unflappable Carey 
[Group 9, B.10, F.73, June 29, 1956, University of Florida Pa-
pers] related to Eaton: “I enclose excerpts from some notes Mr. 
May gave me when he took me to lunch to criticize my article 
in the May, 1956 Journal. I am omitting some of the notes of a 
personal nature.” 
THE AICPA TURNS TO LOBBYING
A desire to burnish the CPA’s image in the public mind was 
not based solely on an idealistic vision of what a true profession 
should be. Blough, Carey, Eaton, and others were cornered into 
action by the encroachments of competing professions. As law-
yers, management consultants, and unlicensed public account- 
ants aggressively pursued new venues for their services, the AIA 
felt compelled to push back, reluctantly forced to expand the 
CPA’s field of competence and to promote itself in the power cor-
ridors of Washington.
Andrew Abbott [1988, p. 2] described jurisdictions (inter-
professional competition) as “a fundamental fact of professional 
life.” It is through competition with other professions that a pro-
fession carves out its professional space. “Control of knowledge 
and its application means dominating outsiders who attack that 
control…the professions make up an interdependent system. 
In this system, each profession has its activities under various 
kinds of jurisdiction…boundaries are perpetually in dispute.” 
U.S. public accountancy embraced the trappings of a modern 
profession – ppublic relations, lobbying, responsibility for all 
members of the profession – in response to the efforts of its 
competitors.
The most pressing jurisdictional challenge from the 1920s 
through the 1950s came from unlicensed public accountants 
(PA). In the post-war era, CPAs were generally college graduates 
who had passed a now nationally standardized and notoriously 
rigorous examination process [Merino, 2006, p. 369]. PAs com-
peted only in local markets and so posed little threat to the Big 
Eight firms. But for small practitioner CPAs, unlicensed PAs 
were interlopers who threatened their status and thwarted goals 
of professional unity. The AIA’s official policy was to encourage 
PAs to obtain the educational and statutory requirements of 
CPAs, something the PAs, not surprisingly, resisted as pointless, 
bureaucratic hoop-jumping [Tinsley, 1983, p. 29]. Although PAs 
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had their own state and nationwide organizations, anyone could 
call himself a public accountant. CPAs major concern was that 
unethical or untrained individuals holding themselves out as 
PAs would damage the reputation of the accounting profession. 
In the 1920s, state CPA societies pursued regulatory or “two-
class” legislation which would license non-certified PAs then 
practicing and prohibit future registration, thus making PAs a 
“dying class.” In another example of the AIA’s aloofness from 
the needs of small practitioners in this era, the AIA officially 
opposed such legislation, hindering the state societies’ efforts 
[Tinsley, 1962, pp. 34-35]. 
The national firms did have substantive reasons for their 
opposition. In several states, regulatory legislation allowed only 
accountants registered in the state to certify financial state-
ments. This proved a serious inconvenience to the national firms 
attempting to serve clients with offices scattered around the 
country. Second, several state-court decisions had questioned 
the constiutionality of regulatory legislation, suggesting that 
it “deprived [PAs] of the fruits of [their] training” [G9, b4, f23, 
April 18, 1946, University of Florida Archives]. Finally, as has 
been noted, the AIA in the 1920s still had a significant number 
of British chartered accountants who were not CPAs, and so 
would be classified with the inferior class of PAs under regulato-
ry legislation {Richardson, 1933c, p. 248]. Most likely, this issue 
explains why the Securities Acts allowed for audits of publicly 
traded companies to be conducted by CPAs or PAs.
In the post-war era, with the AIA’s new focus on the con-
cerns of small practitioners, the PA movement became one of 
its most pressing issues. In 1945, spurred partly by the influx 
of returning veterans and because the demand for account-
ing services far outpaced the number of CPAs, the National 
Society of Public Accountants {NSPA) was formed and com-
menced lobbying state legislatures and the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue (later the Internal Revenue Service) to recognize 
non-certified PAs as equal in status and qualifications to CPAs 
[Texas Society of CPAs, 1946, p. 5]. Some PAs even pressed to 
abolish the CPA designation altogether [Tinsley, 1962, p. 68]. 
The NSPA apparently made considerable headway in gain-
ing credibility for its members in Congress. In 1957, the AIA 
learned, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation 
inquired of the NSPA “soliciting suggestions for improve-
ments in individual tax forms 1040 and 1040A. The AIA was 
not asked to assist in this study. “[The Joint Committee] 
apparently felt that our members would not be as well in-
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formed about individual tax returns as the public account- 
ants. Efforts have already been made to disabuse them of this 
idea” [G9, B5,F32, memo, “Activities of the NSPA,” October 9, 
1957, University of Florida Archives]. 
It was specifically in response to the challenge from the 
NSPA that the AIA finally chose to rid itself of the last vestige 
of the old Wall Street elite and change its name to the AICPA 
[AICPA, 1957, p. 1]. This had been a contentious issue in 1936, 
even threatening to scuttle the consolidation. As Carey remem-
bered: “In 1936, the question of what the name of the surviving 
organization should be was naturally charged with emotion 
and loyalties…the membership defeated the proposal [to adopt 
the name AICPA]. There was some bitterness among those who 
favored it” [G9, b5, f26, January 20, 1955, University of Florida 
Archives]. The change was opposed because some members felt 
that the name AIA had aquired a prestige in business and po-
litical circles. But there was another more dubious justification 
that suggests the arrogance and inflexibility of the old AIA: “The 
American Institute of Accountants is a more euphonious term 
than is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants…
the proposed name is longer, will not make as neat looking a let-
terhead and in general it will be cumbersome” [Springer, 1936, 
p. 632]. Over the course of the next 20 years, remnants of the old 
guard as well as inertia kept the AIA from changing its name, 
even though “on numerous occassions, members have sug-
gested that the change of the AIA’s name would be very helpful 
to them in associating the title Certified Public Accountants with 
the Institute’s many excellent publications and public relations 
activities. Some members have shown difficulty in understand-
ing why the Institute should persist in its present title” [G9, b5, 
f26, January 20, 1955, University of Florida Archives]. But it was 
only in March 1954 that the Journal of Accountancy’s subhead-
ing became: “Published monthly by the American Institute of 
Accountants, the national professional society of certified public 
accountants.” Finally, in 1957, the AIA became the AICPA. Eaton 
considered this one of his crowning achievements as president 
of the Institute [G9, B15, Dcember 26, 1956, University of Flori-
da Archives].
While initially a small-practitioner concern, the PA move-
ment eventually redounded to the national firms as well. In the 
early days of the income tax in the 1910s, the legal profession 
spurned tax work and left the field to accountants [Carey, 1949, 
p. 3; Chatov, 1975, p. 42]. As the complexity and ubiquity of 
taxes grew, however, the ranks of tax lawyers expanded, leading 
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to a long-running battle with the accounting profession. The 
growth of the PA movement seemed to damage the prestige of 
CPAs, as the NSPA began lobbying Congress to allow PAs to 
represent their clients before the Treasury Department [G9, B5, 
F32, May 8, 1957, University of Florida Archives]. The AIA was 
deeply alarmed by this development, fearing that lawyers and 
legislators tended to lump all accountants together [G9, B5, 
F26, “Comment on Dean Griswold’s Speech,” 1957, University 
of Florida Archives; G9, B4, F23, December 12, 1955, Univer-
sity of Florida Archives]. These fears came to a head with the 
Agran case in 1954, which briefly threatened to restrict the right 
of CPAs to represent clients before the Treasury Department 
[Carey, 1970, p. 240].
It was the AIA’s fears of the inroads made by PAs and law-
yers that persuaded it to take a more active role in lobbying. 
It began keeping close tabs on the Washington activities of the 
PAs: “The National Society of Public Accountants [NSPA] has 
recently acquired some powerful friends in its drive to extract 
greater recognition from the Treasury” [G9, b5, F32, October 9, 
1958, University of Florida Archives]. In 1955, the AIA began es-
tablishing stronger contacts with key congressmen and cabinet 
departments with the help of a public relations and lobbying 
firm to supplement the efforts of Covington & Burling, the law 
firm that had represented the AIA in Washington since the 1920s 
[G9, b4, F23, December 5. 1955, University of Florida Archives]. 
The AIA also established a Washington office for the first 
time since the 1930s. The ASCPA, although not the AIA, had 
maintained an office in Washington for years, and initially the 
office was to be maintained as part of the new organization. 
But although many thought it important to have a presence in 
Washington, the office was closed in 1937. The AIA determined 
that “adequate information and advice regarding legislation and 
departmental regulations, and introductions, when necessary, 
to Governmental officials, have always been readily obtained 
through counsel to the Institute, who are situated in Washing-
ton…the volume of activity does not appear to justify the cost of 
maintaining the office” [“Closing of Washington Office,” 1937, p. 
27; see also Montgomery, 1936, p. 329]. 
The office was reopened by the AICPA in 1959, but only 
with great reluctance. Carey cautioned: “The Institute can-
not overlook how its actions may affect its public relations. If 
it behaves like a trade union, quarreling over a monopolistic 
privelege, it will attract little support and perhaps contempt and 
ridicule. This is particularly important in view of present rela-
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tions with the legal profession. If on the other hand it acts like a 
leader, shows no desire to punish its opponents or to oppress a 
weaker group of people, it may get the credit for a statesmanlike 
approach to a problem which is of real interest to the public” 
[G9, b4, f23, December 1, 1955, University of Florida Archives]. 
Carey [1970, p. 436] would also note in his official history that 
the new office “gave the Institute a visibility in the nation’s 
capital which had not existed before,” although he insists “the 
charge to the Washington staff was not to lobby.” 
The AIA’s response to the union corruption scandals show-
cased its new determination to make its presence felt in the na-
tion’s capital. In 1955, a special Senate subcommittee, known as 
the McClellan Committee after its chair, John McClellan, began 
hearings investigating corruption in trade unions. These hear-
ings, best remembered today for the exchanges between Senate 
counsel Robert Kennedy and frequent witness Jimmy Hoffa, 
exposed intimidation, violence, and corruption in the handling 
of union funds. The hearings showed that a lack of proper finan-
cial controls played a role in the corruption – bookkeeping was 
erratic or nonexistent, union funds were embezzled by bosses, 
and fraudulent financial statements were presented to the rank-
and-file [Doron, 2009, p. 221]. Among the proposals to clean up 
the unions was a requirement for annual financial-statement 
audits. The NSPA sent its president, Raymond Jennison, to tes-
tify before Congress on the skills that public accountants could 
offer, and the AICPA felt obliged to send its own representative 
to advocate an expansion of the audit franchise for the first 
time since the New Deal. Blough, as director of research for the 
AICPA, testified before Congress in 1957 and again in 1959, ar-
ticulating the profession’s reticence: 
The Institute is not a frequent witness before Con-
gress…It has been the policy of our institute up until 
last year not to make this type of representation before 
Congress on the basis that, if we appeared on bills of 
this kind, it would be taken that we were self-serving in 
our appearance, that the purpose we had in mind was 
to get more work for CPAs. For that reason, we were 
very reluctant, for years, to make any presentations of 
this type. But about a year ago our executive commit-
tee reached the conclusion that this was not a sound 
policy, that where fiscal matters were involved on which 
we should have specialized knowledge, we should make 
ourselves available for questioning and should make 
representations, as I have here today, on matters in 
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which we feel we have particular abilities [U.S. Con-
gress, 1959, pp. 979, 985]. 
While the old Wall Street elite would surely have shunned 
the idea of involving themselves with trade unions, by 1957, 
the AICPA felt it could not afford to concede any ground to the 
NSPA. As a result, it offered the services of CPAs to unions that 
often had poor financial controls, thereby risking huge new li-
abilities if any fraud were to occur on its watch. Perhaps at no 
other time in the profession’s history has it made such a gener-
ous offer in the name of public service, although its motives 
were considerably more complex. 
By 1962, the AICPA’s attitude towards active lobbying had 
undergone a virtual transformation. At a hearing on the needs 
of small business, Robert Witschey, nominee for president of the 
AICPA, eagerly promoted the CPA as business advisor: “The tra-
ditional functions of the certified public accountant have been 
the independent auditing of financial statements leading to the 
expression of an opinion as to their fairness, and consultation 
on tax problems. After World War II, however, it became ap-
parent that one of the most important needs of small-business 
management was assistance in areas where the training and 
experience of CPA’s gave them special skills.” Witschey further 
relates a study that found CPAs were the most sought-after 
outside consultants among small business manufacturers [U.S. 
Congress, 1962, pp. 113-114]. Gone are Blough’s qualifiers about 
the AICPA not wanting to appear self-serving.
THE PROFESSION AND MANAGEMENT-ADVISORY 
SERVICES
The growth in the complexity of business, particularly the 
increasing reliance on electronic data-processing technology, 
helped to fuel the market for consulting services after the war. 
For the most part, the profession welcomed the opportunity to 
expand its scope of service, hoping “to improve the prestige of 
the CPA as an advisor to management, and to increase the reli-
ance of the business community upon the CPA” [Frisbee, 1957, 
p. 29]. In no small part, the AIA’s embrace of this field stemmed 
from its new focus on the needs of small practitioners. National 
firms were developing MAS departments independently of the 
AIA, and the concerns about maintaining independence when 
performing both audit and non-audit services to a client did not 
apply to small practitioners whose clients generally were not 
publicly traded corporations. 
24
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
135Doron, Evolution of American Public Accountancy
Nonetheless, concerns about the impact of MAS on firms 
large and small were raised even in these early years. Many 
feared that the CPA was extending himself into areas beyond 
his competence, and some echoed the cautionary from May that 
the “noble obligation” of the independent auditor could be jeop-
ardized “as a result of this expanding service to management” 
[“A Talk With George O. May,” 1956, p. 42; on competence, see 
“Management Services by CPAs,” 1957, p. 42]. Some also noted 
more inter-firm competition in the rush to obtain MAS clients 
[Alvin Jennings memo, G9,b10, f77, December 27, 1956, Univer-
sity of Florida Archives].
But what drove the expansion into the MAS field were the 
demands of the post-war era. Eaton observed that “many clients 
ask for consulting help, [and] are disappointed when the CPA 
cannot or will not provide it” [G9, b7, f40, University of Florida 
Archives]. This fueled the profession’s greatest fear regarding 
MAS; namely, that competing professions would take the work 
if CPAs did not move quickly to establish themselves: “We must 
give more attention to improving this type of service lest the day 
come when we find ourselves doing the hard work of digging out 
and analyzing complex financial facts only to find management 
consultants and others providing the advice, representation, and 
management aids based on those facts” [Witschey, G9, b3, F16, 
1956, University of Florida Archives; see also “Management Ser-
vices,” 1946, p. 5]. Finally, CPAs’ work in the MAS field touched 
on the campaign to end reliance on temporary workers as firms 
hoped to find more year-round work for staff by securing con-
sulting engagements [Previts, 1985, p. 80].
CONCLUSIONS
Public accountancy in the U.S. modernized and profession-
alized in the mid-20th century as a result of several forces – gov-
ernment regulation, unwanted publicity from the M&R scandal, 
the demands of World War II, pressure from competing profes-
sions, and, not least, by the vision of several leaders who pushed 
and prodded U.S. accountancy to meet the demands these forces 
placed upon it. This evolution was not without its consequences 
for the profession. A new business model was created for U.S. 
public accountancy in the 1950s, one that aggressively and effec-
tively wielded power in the nation’s capital. The AICPA “and its 
generally ferocious lobbyists” became “accustomed to getting its 
way in Washington” [Spinner, 2002, p. E1; Stone, 2002, p. 793]. 
In 1973, proposals in Congress to expand auditors’ indepen-
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dence and to create stronger audit committees failed when the 
AICPA weighed in with assurances that self-regulation remained 
effective [Turner, 2006, p. 383]. Over the next three decades, the 
profession continued to fight restrictions on accounting firms’ 
expanding scope of services, particularly MAS work, and “in 
2000, the accounting industry’s potent lobby trained its big guns 
on Securities & Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt 
Jr. – and blew him out of the water.” When they continued this 
strategy after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, “the hard-
line strategy backfired,” and the profession was shut out of the 
negotiations that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
“effectively ended” the profession’s self-regulation [Henry and 
McNamee, 2003, p. 56, Glover et. al., 2009, p. 222]. As George 
May had warned, the AICPA had become an advocate for its 
members rather than an arbiter of accounting practice.
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